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After slightly narrowing during the cyclical slow-
down of 2001, the U.S. current account deficit wid-
ened in 2002, as it had over the previous decade. 
Two-thirds of the increase in the deficit last year was 
attributable to an increase in the deficit for trade in 
goods and services. In addition, net investment 
income receded as receipts from abroad declined 
more than payments on foreign investments in the 
United States. 
Most of the rise in the trade deficit in 2002 was the 
result of an increase in the value of imported goods 
and services. Imports had declined sharply in the 
previous year in response to the slowdown in U.S. 
economic activity, and as activity accelerated in 2002, 
imports reversed much of their earlier decline. 
Although the pace of expansion also began to pick up 
in the economies of the United States' foreign trading 
partners last year, the value of U.S. exports declined 
for the second year in a row, albeit to a much smaller 
extent than in 2001. 
[note: 1]. In fact, as discussed below, although the value of exports for 
2002 as a whole was below its 2001 level, exports actually rose from 
the fourth quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002. [end of note.] 
These movements caused the 
deficit in goods and services to rise to $436 billion in 
2002 (table 1). 
Table 1. U.S. international transactions, 1998-2002 
Billions of dollars except as noted 
Item  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Change, 
2001-02 
Trade in goods and services, net  -167  -262  -379  -358  -436  -77 
Goods, net  -247  -346  -452  -427  -484  -57 
Services, net  80  84  74  69  49  -20 
Investment income, net  13  24  28  21  -5  -26 
Compensation of employees, net  -5  -6  -6  -6  -6  0 
Unilateral current transfers, net  -45  -49  -53  -49  -56  -7 
Current account balance  -204  -293  -410  -393  -503  -110 
Official capital, net  -27  55  36  0  93  94 
Private capital, net  91  210  373  382  381  -1 
Financial account balance  64  265  409  382  474  92 
Capital account balance  1  -3  1  1  1  0 
Statistical discrepancy  139  31  0  11  29  18 
MEMO 
Current account as percent of GDP  -2.3  -3.2  -4.2  -3.9  -4.8  -9 (note: Percentage point change.) 
NOTE. Here and in the following tables, components may not sum to totals 
because of rounding. 
SOURCE. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), U.S. international transactions accounts. 
A swing in the balance on investment income, 
from a $21 billion surplus in 2001 to a $5 billion 
deficit in 2002, reflected primarily a decline in net 
direct investment income. Increases in the profitabil-
ity of foreign direct investment in the United States 
last year helped to boost payments to foreigners 
above the abnormally low levels of 2001. Receipts on 
U.S. direct investment abroad were held back by 
continued economic slack and low profits in many 
foreign economies. The deficit in portfolio income 
rose very slightly but would have increased consid-
erably more were it not for the low levels of interest 
rates at home and abroad. 
The record $503 billion current account deficit 
registered in 2002 was also a record as a share of 
GDP—4.8 percent (chart 1). The counterpart of this 
deficit was a $474 billion surplus in the financial 
account balance, an increase of $92 billion over the 
2001 financial account surplus. The rise in the sur-
plus was attributable primarily to stepped-up foreign 
official purchases of U.S. assets; changes in the com-
ponents of private capital flows largely offset each 
other. The statistical discrepancy in the U.S. interna-
tional accounts also rose. 
An implication of the large U.S. current account 
deficits in recent years has been that, taken together, the economies of the rest of world have been running 
a current account surplus (see box ''The Foreign 
Counterpart to the U.S. Current Account Deficit''). 
Chart 1. U.S. external balances, 1970-2002 
[graph plotting the percent of GDP of two lines: Net private capital  and current account balance, from 1970 through 2002. They start 1970  with current account balance at about .3%, and net private capital at  about -1%. They meet at about -.4% in 1972. In 1975 current account  balance is about 1.1%, and net private capital about -1.5%. They meet  again at about -.7% in 1977. In 1981 current account balance was  about .2% and net private capital about -.8%. They cross at about -.4%  in 1982. In 1987 current account balance is down to about -3.3% and  net private capital is up to about 2.3%. In 1991 current account balance  was about 0, net private capital about .5%. They end 2002 with current  account balance about -4.8% and Net private capital about 3.7%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. 
SOURCE. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA). 
MAJOR ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS. 
Several factors had a significant influence on U.S. 
international transactions in 2002: the emergence 
of the U.S. and foreign economies from the cyclical 
slowdown in 2001, increases in the prices of oil 
and other primary commodities, the reversal of the 
dollar' s appreciating trend, and movements in real 
returns at home and abroad. 
U.S. Economic Activity. 
After remaining unchanged during 2001, U.S. real 
GDP increased 2.9 percent between the fourth quarter 
of 2001 and the fourth quarter of 2002 (table 2). 
Economic conditions turned up notably during the 
first half of the year. Household spending on both 
personal consumption items and housing remained 
solid, businesses curtailed their inventory liquidation 
and began to raise spending on some types of capital 
equipment, and private employment began to edge 
higher. For the first half of 2002, real GDP grew 
3.1 percent at an annual rate. 
Table 2. Change in real GDP in the United States and abroad, 1999-2002 
Percent, annual rate 









United States  4.3  2.3  .1  2.9  -1.1  1.2  3.1  2.7 
Total foreign  4.9  4.2  .1  2.8  -.2  .4  3.6  2.1 
Asian emerging markets
1 
8.6  6.1  1.0  5.5  -.9  2.9  6.9  4.2 
China  4.1  8.0  7.5  8.0  8.0  7.1  8.9  7.1 
Indonesia  5.3  6.4  1.7  3.8  6.2  -2.6  10.7  -2.7 
Korea  13.8  5.1  4.2  7.0  3.3  5.0  8.0  6.1 
Malaysia  11.8  6.2  -.6  5.5  -3.3  2.2  6.1  4.9 
Philippines  5.1  3.7  3.9  5.8  4.0  3.7  5.6  5.9 
Taiwan  5.9  4.5  -1.8  4.1  -6.9  3.5  4.8  3.4 
Latin America
 2  4.4  4.4  -1.5  1.1  -1.5  -1.4  1.8  .5 
Argentina  -.9  -1.9  -10.3  -4.0  -1.1  -18.6  -10.5  2.9 
Brazil  3.5  4.0  -.7  3.4  .0  -1.4  3.5  3.3 
Mexico  5.6  4.7  -1.5  2.1  -2.0  -1.0  3.2  .9 
Venezuela  -4.1  5.6  .9  -16.7  2.2  -.4  -17.0  -16.4 
Canada  5.7  3.5  .8  3.9  .4  1.2  5.2  2.6 
European Union
3  3.7  2.7  .6  1.4  1.1  .1  1.5  1.3 
Japan  -.5  5.1  -2.4  2.8  -1.6  -3.2  2.9  2.7 
NOTE. Aggregate measures are weighted by moving bilateral shares in U.S. 
exports of merchandise. Annual data are four-quarter changes. Half-yearly data 
are calculated as Q4/Q2 or Q2/Q4 changes at an annual rate. 
1. Weighted average of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
2. Weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. 
3. Member countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
SOURCE. Various national sources; Federal Reserve seasonal adjustments in 
some cases. 
However, the momentum of the recovery dimin-
ished somewhat as the year progressed. Concerns 
about corporate governance weighed on financial 
markets, and a rise in international tensions boosted 
oil prices and exacerbated uncertainties already faced 
by businesses about the economic outlook. By mid-
summer, stock prices had declined, risk spreads wid-
ened, and liquidity eroded in corporate debt markets. 
These developments, combined with a high degree of 
underlying caution on the part of businesses, contrib-
uted to continued weak capital spending. [beginning of box:] The Foreign Counterpart to the U.S. Current Account Deficit 
The counterpart of the current account deficit in the United 
States is an aggregate current account surplus in the rest of 
the world. Current account balances are influenced by a 
variety of factors that differ from country to country, and 
those of foreign economies exhibit quite diverse move-
ments as the U.S. current account changes. In the 1980s, 
during the last large run-up in the U.S. current account 
deficit, much of the imbalance was matched by current 
account surpluses in the economies of the European Union 
(EU) and Japan. For example, in 1987, the U.S. current 
account deficit reached $161 billion, or 3.4 percent of GDP, 
while the EU countries and Japan recorded current account 
surpluses of $28 billion and $85 billion respectively 
(chart A). This state of affairs was broadly consistent with 
the importance of these two areas in U.S. trade at the time: 
Together, the EU countries and Japan accounted for about 
40 percent of U.S. exports and imports. It was also consis-
tent with the especially marked rise in the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar against the currencies of those countries 
in the mid-1980s. 
Chart A. Current account balances, United States, Japan, and 
the European Union, 1975-2002 
[graph plotting the billions of dollars of three lines: japan, european  union, and united states from 1975 through 2002. In 1975 Japan was  about $0, US about $15 billion, and EU about -$50 billion. In 1979  they were all about $0. The beginning of 1982 Japan and US were  about $0, but EU was about -$30 billion. In 1987 Japan was about  $90 billion, EU about $20 billion, and US about -$170 billion. In  1991 Japan was about $70 billion, EU about -$90 billion, and US  about $0. In 1996 Japan and EU were about $70 billion and US  about -$110 billion. In 2000 Japan was about $120 billion, EU  about -$40 billion, and US about -$410 billion. They end 2002  with Japan about $110 billion, EU about $60 billion, and US about  -$500 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. For membership of the European Union, see 
note 3 of table 2 in the main text. The European Union balance is 
calculated as the sum of the balances of individual European Union 
countries. 
SOURCE. BEA; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook database. 
The most recent rise in the U.S. current account deficit 
has been associated with a distribution of counterpart sur-
pluses abroad that differs somewhat from the 1980s pattern. 
As in the mid-1980s, Japan is running a surplus, although at 
about $110 billion last year it is only moderately larger than 
in 1987, even as the U.S. deficit is currently about three 
times as large as it was then. The European Union's surplus 
last year was only about $50 billion, a small counterpart 
to the U.S. deficit. Conversely, the Asian emerging-market 
economies, whose share of U.S. imports has risen from 
about 16 percent in the mid-1980s to about 24 percent more 
recently, ran a current account surplus of nearly $120 bil-
lion in 2002, a considerably larger balance than they 
recorded in the mid-1980s (chart B). Finally, the largest 
single counterpart to the U.S. imbalance is the global statis-
tical discrepancy, which is the negative of the sum of the 
world's current accounts (chart C). In principle, the world's 
current accounts should sum to zero, but because of statisti-
cal problems and misreporting of payments and receipts, the 
statistical discrepancy is generally not zero and can some-
times be quite large. Increases in oil revenues earned by 
countries whose international transactions are not well 
reported, along with rising cross-border holdings of assets 
(returns on which also are frequently underreported), may 
explain some of the growth of the discrepancy in recent 
years. 
Chart B. Current account balances, United States and Asian 
emerging markets, 1975-2002 
[graph plotting the billions of dollars of two lines: Asian emerging  markets and United States from 1975 through 2002. They start  1975 with Asian about -$5 billion, US about $10 billion. In 1982  they are both about -$5 billion. In 1987 Asian is about $30 billion  and US about -$170 billion. In 1991 Japan is about $10 billion,  US about $5 billion. In 1996 Japan is about -$30 billion, US about  -$100 billion. They end 2002 with Asian about $120 billion and  US at about -$500 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The Asian emerging markets are China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Thailand. For 2002, balances for some Asian economies are estimates. 
SOURCE. BEA; IMF, World Economic Outlook database. 
Chart C. U.S. current account balance and aggregate statistical 
discrepancy for all countries, 1975-2002 
[graph plotting the billions of dollars of two lines: aggregate  discrepancy and U.S. current account from 1975 through 2002.  In 1975 aggregate discrepancy was about $70 billion, us current  account about $20 billion. In 1981 US current account is about $0  and aggregate discrepancy about $80 billion. By 1987 US current  account is down to about -$170 billion and aggregate discrepancy  at about $60 billion. In 1992, US current account was about $0  and aggregate discrepancy about $120 billion. In 1997 aggregate  discrepancy was about -$10 billion and US current account about  -$120 billion. By 2002 US current account was about -$500 billion  and aggregate discrepancy was about $140 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. 
SOURCE. BEA; IMF, World Economic Outlook database. [end of box.] With 
Foreign demand for U.S. products weakening as well, 
manufacturers trimmed production during the fall. 
Employment in the private sector declined again, and 
the unemployment rate moved up, reaching 6 percent 
in December. For the second half of 2002, the growth 
of real GDP declined to 2.7 percent at an annual rate, 
and for the fourth quarter it was only 1.4 percent. 
Foreign Economic Activity. 
After a pronounced slowdown in 2001, economic 
activity accelerated in the economies of U.S. trading 
partners in 2002 as it did in the United States. Higher 
growth abroad reflected a number of factors, includ-
ing monetary and fiscal stimulus, reductions in the 
pace of inventory liquidation, and the effect of 
increasing economic activity in the United States. 
The pickup in growth abroad, as in the United States, 
was concentrated in the first half of last year, as a 
strong rally in the high-tech exporting economies of 
emerging-market Asia was joined by robust growth 
in Canada and, to a lesser extent, Mexico. Growth 
in other regions—including the euro area and South 
America—remained subdued. As the U.S. economy 
decelerated in the second half, the pace of recovery 
slowed in Asia and Canada, while performance 
remained lackluster in much of the rest of the world. 
The Canadian economy registered the strongest 
performance among the major foreign economies last 
year despite some slowing in the second half. Its 
strength reflected robust growth of consumption and 
residential construction as well as an end to inventory 
runoffs early in the year. As a net oil exporter, Canada 
has also benefited from the high level of oil prices, 
and because it is less dependent on high-tech produc-
tion than is the United States, it likewise suffered less 
from the on-going weakness in that sector. 
The Japanese economy grew during 2002, although 
the pace of growth was barely enough to offset the 
decline in output that took place in 2001. Japanese 
growth was driven mainly by exports, with smaller 
contributions coming from increased consumption 
and a slower pace of inventory reduction. However, 
private investment spending and conditions in labor 
markets remained weak, and deflation continued. 
Economic performance in the euro area was quite 
sluggish last year. Although exports were up, growth 
in consumption was modest, and private investment 
declined. Economic weakness was especially pro-
nounced in some of the larger countries—Germany, 
Italy, and, to a lesser extent, France—while growth 
in some of the smaller euro-area countries was more 
robust. 
In the emerging-market economies last year, eco-
nomic performance diverged considerably between 
Asia and Mexico, on the one hand, and the rest of 
Latin America, on the other. The Asian emerging-
market economies generally performed well in 2002; 
they were led, as in previous years, by China, where 
real GDP again expanded more than 7 percent. Of the 
other emerging Asian economies, Korea recorded the 
strongest growth. The economy grew more rapidly in 
the first half of the year, when global demand for 
high-tech products rose most quickly and domestic 
demand (especially consumption) surged; growth 
slowed in the second half of the year as global 
high-tech demand weakened and tensions over 
North Korea intensified. Other economies in the 
region, including some of the larger Southeast Asian 
economies and Taiwan, also exhibited strong perfor-
mance in the first half of 2002 followed by some 
weakening of growth in the second. 
One of the few bright spots in Latin America last 
year was the Mexican economy—boosted by the U.S. 
recovery, its growth was moderate for the year as a 
whole despite some late slowing. Conversely, much 
of South America was beset by adverse economic, 
financial, and political developments. In Brazil, eco-
nomic activity managed to expand in 2002, despite 
considerable financial volatility surrounding the 
October presidential election. Argentine GDP con-
tracted further in 2002 after declining 10 percent in 
2001, although financial and economic conditions 
appeared to stabilize in the second half of the year. 
Output plunged in Venezuela in the midst of extreme 
economic and political turmoil, including a coup 
attempt in April and a national strike declared in 
December. 
Primary-Commodity Prices. 
Oil prices began 2002 at less than $20 per barrel for 
West Texas intermediate (chart 2), having declined 
considerably in the previous year amidst widespread 
economic weakness. Much of the decline occurred 
after the events of September 11, 2001, in response to 
a fall in jet fuel consumption, weaker economic activ-
ity, and reassurances of stable supply from Saudi 
Arabia. However, oil prices began rising again in 
February and March of 2002 in response to both 
improving global economic activity and a production-
limiting agreement among OPEC and some major 
non-OPEC producers. As a consequence of this 
agreement, actual production declined, albeit not to 
the extent implied by the agreed limits. Heightened 
tensions in the Middle East, along with severe politi-cal turmoil in Venezuela, also put upward pressure on 
oil prices. A strike in Venezuela, which began on 
December 2, 2002, caused already meager crude oil 
inventories in the United States to fall to levels not 
seen since the 1970s; the reduced inventories exacer-
bated the effect of the reduced production on oil 
prices. 
Chart 2. Oil prices, 1986-2002 
[graph of dollar per barrel plotting two lines: West Texas Intermediate  Spot Price and U.S. Import from 1986 through 2002.  The lines are pretty much the same, with West Texas about 2 to $4  more than import. They start 1986 at about $25 a barrel. The end of  1986 West texas is about $15 and US Import about $11. In mid 1987  they are up: west texas to about $22 and import about $18. End of  1988 they are down with West Texas about $14 and Import about $13.  The end of 1990 there is a spike with West Texas up to about $36 and  import about $30. Early 1991 they are back down, West Texas to about  $20 and Import to about $18. They move down until 1994, West Texas  reaching about $15 and import about $12.50. Move up till the beginning  of 1997 with West Texas about $25 and import about $23. Down until  early 1999 with West Texas about $12 and import about $10. Up until  late 2000, with West Texas about $35 and import about $30. Down to  early 2002 with West texas about $20 and import about $16. Ends  2002 with West Texas about $29 and import about $25.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly. 
SOURCE. Wall Street Journal; BEA. 
Prices of nonfuel primary commodities (chart 3) 
also picked up somewhat last year after falling 
steadily throughout much of 2001. Most of the 
increase in prices reflected decreases in supply. 
Adverse weather in many parts of the world reduced 
harvests and sent prices of several agricultural 
commodities—wheat, soybeans, and cotton— 
soaring, albeit from very depressed levels. Also, 
cocoa prices rose because of a civil war in Ivory 
Coast, which produces a substantial fraction of the 
world's cocoa. Production restraint by copper produc-
ers led to a slight gain in the price of that commodity. 
Finally, the price of gold shot up more than 20 per-
cent last year, most likely in response to heightened 
global tensions. 
Chart 3. Price of world nonfuel primary commodities, 
1993-2002 
[graph with index based on 1995 = 100. It starts with  1993 at about 82.5. Stays around there until early 1994  and moves up to 100 in 1995. Moves down to about 98  in early 1996. Spiked up to about 105 in mid 1996, then  down to about 94 in late 1996. Up to about 100 in mid  1997. Then sloping mostly down, reaching about 74 in  early 1999. Up to about 81 in early 2000. Down to  about 70 in late 2001. Then up, ending 2002 at about  80.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly. The price shown is a weighted average of 
forty-five prices. 
SOURCE. IMF, International Financial Statistics, index of nonfuel primary 
commodity prices in dollars. 
U.S. Price Competitiveness. 
Changes in the price competitiveness of U.S. export 
and import-competing industries last year were pri-
marily the result of changes in the foreign exchange 
value of the dollar, as well as relative movements in 
inflation rates at home and abroad. The price-adjusted 
broad dollar index is a measure of the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar in terms of the curren-
cies of the United States' principal trading partners, 
adjusted for relative movements in U.S. and foreign 
inflation rates. Having appreciated substantially since 
the mid-1990s, the broad real dollar index extended 
its mild upward trend into the early part of 2002 
(chart 4). However, the dollar weakened sharply in 
late spring and early summer amid deepening con-
cerns about U.S. corporate governance and profitabil-
ity. Around that time, market analysts also appeared 
to become more worried about the growing U.S. 
current account deficit and its potential negative 
influence on the future value of the dollar. After 
strengthening a bit around midyear as growth pros-
pects for other major economies appeared to dim, the 
broad real dollar index dropped again late in the year 
as geopolitical tensions intensified; it registered a 
1 3/4 percent decline for the year as a whole. 
Chart 4. Foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar, 1990-2002 
[graph with index based on 1996 = 100, plotting three lines: Major  currencies, broad index, and other important trading partners.  In 1990, major currencies was about 102, broad index about 104, and  other about 108. major currencies varies between about 107 and 98  before reaching 101 in 1994. Broad Index varies between about 103  and 92 before reaching 101 in 1994. Other has 1-2 point jaggs while  sloping down to 101 in 1994. Major currencies goes down to about  90 before hitting 100 in 1996, broad index goes down to about 96  before hitting 100 in 1996, and other goes up to about 109 before  hitting 100 in 1996. Then they mostly tend upwards, keeping within  10 points of each other, until separating after all hitting about 113 in  late 1999. Major currencies reaches about 136 in early 2002, broad  index hits about 128, other about 118. They all reach about 123  at the end of 2002.] 
NOTE. The data are monthly. Each data series is a price-adjusted index of 
foreign currency units per dollar. The broad index covers a large group of 
important U.S. trading partners. The major currencies index covers the 
currencies that are widely traded in international financial markets. In 2002, the dollar depreciated against all of the 
major currencies—those currencies that trade widely 
in international financial markets—but the magnitude 
of these declines varied. The dollar showed particular 
weakness against the euro; the dollar's decline of 
16 percent more than reversed a substantial portion 
of its rise against the euro in the preceding couple of 
years. The dollar declined about 10 percent against 
the yen last year. Relative to the Canadian dollar, 
however, the U.S. dollar declined only 1 percent on 
balance. 
Even as the dollar declined 7 percent on a price-
adjusted basis against the major currencies last 
year, it appreciated 4V2 percent against a weighted 
average of the currencies of other U.S. trading part-
ners. This appreciation occurred despite a decline 
in the dollar against the currencies of Asian 
emerging-market economies and is accounted for 
almost entirely by a rise of the dollar against the 
Mexican peso. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND 
SERVICES. 
The U.S. trade deficit in goods and services, having 
narrowed significantly in 2001, widened in 2002 and 
thereby resumed its trend of the past decade (table 3). 
The $77 billion expansion of the trade deficit last 
year reflected a $51 billion rise in the nominal value 
of imports and a $26 billion reduction—the second 
annual decline—in exports. 
Table 3. U.S. international trade in goods and services, 2000-2002 
Billions of dollars except as noted 







Year over year 
Percent change, 
2001-02 
Q4 to Q4 
Balance (exports less imports)  -379  -358  -436  20  -77 
Exports  1,064  998  972  -66  -26  -3  5 
Services  292  279  289  -13  10  4  14 
Goods  772  719  683  -53  -36  -5  2 
Capital equipment  357  322  291  -35  -31  -10  -1 
Aircraft and parts  48  53  51  5  -2  -4  -1 
Computer equipment
1  56  48  39  -8  -9  -19  -7 
Semiconductors  60  45  42  -15  -3  -6  5 
Telecommunications equipment  31  28  22  -3  -6  -20  -13 
Other machinery and equipment  162  149  137  -13  -12  -8  0 
Industrial supplies  173  160  157  -12  -3  -2  8 
Automotive vehicles and parts  80  75  78  -5  3  4  4 
Consumer goods  89  88  84  -1  -4  -4  1 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  48  49  50  2  0  0  2 
Other  25  24  23  -1  -1  -5  3 
Imports  1,443  1,356  1,407  -87  51  4  14 
Services  219  210  240  -8  30  14  19 
Goods  1,224  1,146  1,167  -78  21  2  13 
Oil  120  104  104  -17  0  0  46 
Non-oil  1,104  1,042  1,063  -62  21  2  10 
Capital equipment  347  298  284  -49  -14  -5  5 
Aircraft and parts  26  31  26  5  -6  -18  -17 
Computer equipment
1  90  74  75  -16  1  2  8 
Semiconductors  48  30  26  -18  -4  -14  6 
Telecommunications equipment  33  25  23  -8  -1  -6  18 
Other machinery and equipment  150  138  134  -12  -4  -3  6 
Industrial supplies  182  173  166  -9  -7  -4  12 
Automotive vehicles and parts  196  190  204  -6  14  7  11 
Consumer goods  282  284  308  2  23  8  16 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  46  47  50  1  3  7  10 
Other  51  51  52  -1  1  2  1 
1. Computers, accessories, peripherals, and parts. 
. . . Not applicable. 
SOURCE. BEA, U. S. international transactions accounts. 
Movements in the annual totals of exports and 
imports from 2001 to 2002, however, obscure impor-
tant movements of these trade figures over the course 
of last year. Nominal exports of goods and services 
hit their recent low in the fourth quarter of 2001 and 
then recovered substantially in the second and third 
quarters of 2002 before reversing some of these gains 
in the fourth quarter (chart 5). Hence, while the 
average value of exports in 2002 was below its 2001 
level, owing to its very depressed level at the start of the year, these receipts actually grew about 5 percent 
between the fourth quarter of 2001 and the fourth 
quarter of 2002 (table 3). Similarly, nominal imports 
of goods and services rose much more rapidly on a 
Q4-to-Q4 basis (14 percent) than they did on a year-
over-year basis (4 percent). 
Chart 5. U.S. imports and exports, 2000-2002 
[graph plotting two lines: imports and exports in  billions of dollars, ratio scale from 2000 through 2002.  The graph starts with imports at about 345 and exports  at about 260. They peak the third quarter of 2000 with  imports about 372 and exports about 274. They hit lows  in the fourth quarter of 2001 with imports at about 320  and exports at about 230. They end quarter four of 2002  with imports at about 365 and exports about 245.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. 
SOURCE. BEA. 
Measured both in terms of nominal values (table 3) 
and quantities (table 4), imports rose faster than 
exports between the fourth quarter of 2001 and the 
fourth quarter of 2002. Imports grew faster than 
exports despite the fact that real GDP here and abroad 
grew at about the same rate last year. This develop-
ment is consistent, however, with a historical pat-
tern in which the responsiveness of U.S. imports to 
income in the United States has been greater than the 
responsiveness of U.S. exports to income in the rest 
of the world. Moreover, because capital goods consti-
tute a greater fraction of U.S. exports than they do of 
U.S. imports, the weakness in investment spending 
both here and abroad last year weighed more heavily 
on exports than on imports. Finally, although the 
dollar depreciated last year, the lagged effects of its 
earlier appreciation continued to support imports 
while restraining exports. 
Table 4. Change in the quantity of U.S. exports and imports 
of goods and services, 1999-2002 
Percent change from fourth quarter to fourth quarter 
Item  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Exports  5  7  -11  4 
Services  3  5  -9  11 
Goods  6  8  -12  1 
Capital equipment
1  7  13  -21  -1 
Aircraft and parts  -17  -14  -4  -3 
Computer equipment
2  13  23  -24  -2 
Semiconductors  34  27  -35  8 
Other machinery and equipment  8  14  -20  -2 
Industrial supplies  7  7  -7  3 
Automotive vehicles and parts  3  1  -5  3 
Consumer goods  5  6  -6  2 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  3  3  5  -6 
Other  -1  6  -6  5 
Imports  12  11  -8  10 
Services  6  11  -9  12 
Goods  13  11  -8  10 
Oil  -3  13  0  4 
Non-oil  15  11  -9  10 
Capital equipment
1  19  17  -21  7 
Aircraft and parts  -2  22  3  -20 
Computer equipment
2  26  14  -14  14 
Semiconductors  34  23  -51  9 
Other machinery and equipment  15  17  -21  10 
Industrial supplies  8  1  -5  8 
Automotive vehicles and parts  14  2  -2  10 
Consumer goods  17  16  -5  17 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  11  6  5  6 
Other  5  16  0  5 
NOTE. Quantities are measured in chained (1996) dollars. 
1 Data for telecommunications equipment not separately calculated. 
2. Computers, accessories, peripherals, and parts. 
SOURCE. BEA, national income and product accounts; Federal Reserve 
Board. 
Exports. 
The 5 percent rise in the nominal value of exported 
goods and services between the fourth quarter of 
2001 and the fourth quarter of 2002 reflects much 
stronger growth in exports of services than of goods. 
Services receipts rose 14 percent over this period 
after having declined sharply in 2001; much of the 
rebound was in receipts from foreign travelers in the 
United States, which recovered somewhat in 2002 
following a plunge immediately after the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks. Receipts from foreigners for 
other services moved up smartly as well. 
In contrast, nominal exports of goods rose only 
2 percent in 2002 (Q4 to Q4); they were held back by 
a 1 percent decline in export sales of capital goods. 
This slowing likely reflected the pronounced weak-
ness of investment spending during the recent global 
slowdown, even as consumption spending held up 
more strongly. Especially large percentage declines 
in exports of computer and telecommunication equip-
ment were consistent with continued weakness in the 
high-tech sector (as well as trend declines in com-
puter prices), while the slight rise in exports of semi-
conductors reversed very little of their pronounced 
decline in 2001. 
outside of the capital goods sector, exports of 
industrial supplies grew substantially over the course 
of 2002, but most of this increase reflected higher 
prices rather than a sharp pick-up in quantities. 
Exports of automotive products also showed some 
strength; the increase was more than accounted for 
by higher shipments of vehicles and parts to Canada. 
The relatively flat dollar-value of sales of food, feed, and beverages abroad reflected the offsetting effects 
of a sharp contraction in exported quantities of these 
products, in part resulting from poor harvests, and 
corresponding increases in their prices. 
The distribution of U.S. sales of goods to different 
parts of the world in 2002 (table 5) was substantially 
influenced by the economic performance of our trad-
ing partners. Exports of goods to those regions show-
ing the strongest performance last year—Canada, the 
Asian emerging-market economies, and Mexico— 
moved up on a Q4-to-Q4 basis, while sales to weaker 
economies—those of western Europe, Japan, and 
South America—declined. The rise over the course 
of 2002 in sales to Canada, which account for 
nearly a quarter of U.S. goods exports, was primarily 
accounted for by automotive products, industrial sup-
plies, and consumer goods and was driven by strong 
household spending. Capital goods, which represent 
the largest end-use category of sales to Canada, 
remained about flat. Exports to the Asian emerging-
market economies were boosted primarily by higher 
sales of industrial supplies (especially chemicals) 
and capital goods. In both western Europe and 
Japan, where economic activity has continued to be 
restrained by weak business investment, mild 
declines in U.S. goods exports resulted almost 
entirely from reductions in sales of capital goods. 
Table 5. Distribution of U.S. exports of goods, 
by selected regions and countries, 2000-2002 
Billions of dollars except as noted 






Q4 to Q4 
All  772  719  683  -36.2  2.0 
Western Europe  179  171  154  -17.8  -1.8 
Canada  179  163  161  -2.4  6.2 
Latin America  170  159  148  -10.6  -.6 
Mexico  111  101  97  -3.8  1.1 
Other  59  58  51  -6.8  -3.6 
Asia  194  173  167  -5.6  3.3 
Japan  63  56  50  -6.2  -2.3 
Emerging markets
1  130  117  118  .6  5.8 
Other  50  52  52  .3  4.8 
1. China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. 
The quantity of exports rose 4 percent in 2002 
(Q4 to Q4) after declining sharply the previous year 
(table 4). As with movements in their value, the 
quantity of exported services rose considerably faster 
than that of goods. Exports of all major categories 
rose except for foods, feeds, and beverages, which 
declined markedly, and capital equipment. 
After declining in 2001 in response to the slow-
down in global growth, export prices rose 2 percent 
last year (Q4 to Q4, table 6); they were boosted by 
higher global growth, an associated firming of com-
modity prices (including petroleum prices), and per-
haps some effects from the weakening dollar. Ser-
vices prices recovered as demand for travel moved 
back up from lows reached after the events of 
September 11, 2001. Weather-related supply disrup-
tions drove up prices of foods, feeds, and beverages 
7 percent, while higher costs of petroleum products, 
natural gas, lumber, and steel led to a 5 percent rise 
in prices of industrial supplies. Prices of exported 
capital equipment edged down again last year and 
reflected trend declines in the prices of computers 
and semiconductors. 
Table 6. Change in the prices of U.S. exports and imports 
of goods and services, 1999-2002 
Percent change from fourth quarter to fourth quarter 
Item  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Exports  0  1  -2  2 
Services  1  2  -2  2 
Goods  0  1  -2  1 
Capital equipment  -1  0  -1  -1 
Aircraft and parts  2  5  5  3 
Computer equipment  -7  -4  -4  -5 
Semiconductors  -4  -5  -6  -3 
Other machinery and equipment  0  1  0  0 
Industrial supplies  4  4  -7  5 
Automotive vehicles and parts  1  1  0  1 
Consumer goods  0  0  0  -1 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  -4  0  -1  7 
Other  1  1  -2  2 
Imports  3  3  -5  4 
Services  0  3  3  7 
Goods  4  3  -7  3 
Oil  94  31  -36  40 
Non-oil  -1  1  -4  0 
Capital equipment  -4  -2  -3  -2 
Aircraft and parts  2  4  3  2 
Computer equipment  -11  -5  -12  -4 
Semiconductors  -3  -2  -3  -3 
Other machinery and equipment  -1  -1  -1  -2 
Industrial supplies  4  11  -13  4 
Automotive vehicles and parts  1  1  0  0 
Consumer goods  -1  -1  -1  -1 
Foods, feeds, and beverages  -3  -2  -3  4 
Other  0  1  -2  1 
NOTE. Price indexes are chain-weighted. See also notes to table 4. 
Imports. 
The value of imports rose 14 percent from the fourth 
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002 (table 3), 
though this gain in part reflects a bounce-back from 
the depressed levels reached in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001. Services, rebounding especially 
quickly, rose 19 percent over the same period. As on the exports side, a surge in travel-related spending by 
U.S. residents abroad following the lows reached 
after September 11, 2001, accounted for much of 
this increase, although other types of services rose 
as well. Imports of goods also rose briskly over the 
course of last year, with increases on a Q4-to-Q4 
basis registered for both the oil and non-oil 
categories. 
Oil Imports. 
The value of oil imports rose 46 percent from the 
fourth quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002 
(table 3). This sharp rise primarily reflected a 40 per-
cent rebound in the price of imported oil last year 
from its low level at the end of 2001. Additionally, 
the pickup in U.S. economic growth in 2002 led 
to a small rise in the quantity of oil imports on a 
Q4-to-Q4 basis; the quantity of oil imports was also 
boosted by some bounce-back from unusually 
depressed levels immediately after September 11, 
2001, when travel fell off sharply. With domestic oil 
consumption last year exceeding the sum of imported 
and domestically produced oil, oil inventories 
declined. 
Non-oil Imports. 
The quantity of non-oil imports rose 10 percent in 
2002 (Q4 to Q4, table 4), reversing a decline of 
similar magnitude in the previous year. Reflecting the 
consumer-led nature of U.S. real GDP growth last 
year, increases were led by double-digit gains in real 
imports of automotive products and consumer goods. 
Imports of industrial supplies and capital equipment 
rose more moderately, with the latter being held back 
by a 20 percent decline in imports of aircraft and 
parts, which are quite volatile. Imports of both com-
puter equipment and semiconductors bounced back 
in 2002 after sharp declines the previous year, but 
increases in the larger '' Other machinery and equip-
ment'' category were more moderate and were well 
below the pace of the previous year' s decline. 
Several factors contributed to the substantial 
growth in the quantity of non-oil imports last year, 
which considerably outpaced the rise in U.S. GDP. 
First, as noted above, imports were unusually 
depressed in the fourth quarter of 2001, so some of 
the subsequent growth reflected a return to more 
normal levels. Second, U.S. non-oil imports, and trad-
able goods in general, are particularly cyclically sen-
sitive. This sensitivity may result from the fact that 
the demand for goods tends to fluctuate over the 
course of the business cycle more than does the 
demand for services and hence more than does GDP 
as a whole; therefore, non-oil goods imports are also 
likely to fluctuate more widely than total GDP. To 
illustrate, the quantity of non-oil imports declined 
9 percent in 2001 (Q4 to Q4), when U.S. activity had 
slowed but did not decline; non-oil imports then rose 
10 percent in 2002, when U.S. growth picked up to 
only about 3 percent. 
[note: 2]. Analogously, the quantity of U.S. goods exports declined 12 per-
cent from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2001, 
when foreign growth declined to about zero. With foreign growth 
having recovered to nearly 3 percent in 2002, however, it is not clear 
why the growth ofreal goods exports rose only to 1 percent. This slow 
growth reflected an anomalous decline in December that was partially 
reversed in January 2003. [end of note.] 
Third, as noted earlier, over 
long periods of time, U.S. imports have tended to 
grow more rapidly than U.S. GDP (even as exports 
have grown more in line with the GDP of U.S. 
trading partners). Finally, imports were likely buoyed 
by the value of the dollar, which remained quite 
strong by historical standards, notwithstanding some 
declines over the course of the year. 
Prices of non-oil imports were flat last year after 
falling 4 percent in 2001 (table 6). Higher commodity 
prices, as well as the effects of the fall in the dollar 
later in the year, led to notable increases in the prices 
of imported industrial supplies and foods, feeds, and 
beverages. However, prices of computers and semi-
conductors extended their persistent declines, while 
still-weak demand in global manufacturing likely 
contributed to further declines in the prices of other 
machinery and equipment as well as consumer goods. 
A brisk 7 percent rise in services prices last year 
probably reflected the decline in the dollar. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NONTRADE CURRENT 
ACCOUNT. 
The major components of the current account other 
than trade in goods and services are investment 
income and unilateral transfers. 
Investment Income. 
Net investment income is the difference between the 
income that U.S. residents earn on their holdings of 
foreign assets (receipts) and the income that foreign-
ers earn on their holdings of U.S. assets (payments). 
If the rates of return on both of these holdings were 
equal, then movements in net investment income would exactly mirror movements in the net interna-
tional investment position, that is, the difference 
between U.S. holdings of foreign assets and foreign 
holdings of U.S. assets. The net international invest-
ment position turned negative in 1986 and has 
declined progressively further since then as large net 
financial inflows have financed the United States' 
current account deficits (chart 6). Even as foreign 
acquisition of U.S. assets has substantially outpaced 
U.S. acquisition of foreign assets, however, net 
investment income remained positive until 2002 
(table 7), as rates of return on U.S. holdings abroad— 
primarily through direct investments—have exceeded 
returns on foreign holdings in the United States. 
Chart 6. U.S. net international investment: 
Position and income, 1980-2002 
[graph plotting two data: a line for Net income in billions of  dollars and bars of net position in billions of dollars. In 1980  net income was about $30 billion, net position about $200  billion. They remain around there but start going down about  1984, net income hitting about $25 billion in 1985 and  net position hitting about $20 billion. In 1986 net income was  about $15 billion, and net position passes into the negatives,  where it stays, starting at about -$100 billion in 1986. Net  position moves steadily downwards, hitting about -$2250  billion in 2002. Net Income stays between about 15 and  $30 billion until 2002, where it passes into about -$5 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The net position is the average of the year-end 
positions for the current and previous years. The year-end position for 2002 
was constructed by adding the recorded portfolio investment flows during 
2002 to the recorded year-end position for 2001. The net position excludes 
U.S. holdings of gold. 
SOURCE. BEA; Federal Reserve Board. 
Table 7. U.S. international investment: Receipts and payments, 1998-2002 
Billions of dollars 
Item  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Change, 
2001-02 
Net investment income  13  24  28  21  -5  -26 
Direct investment: 
Net income  66  75  89  103  78  -25 
Direct investment: Receipts  104  128  150  126  128  2 
Direct investment: Payments  38  53  61  23  50  27 
Portfolio investment: 
Net income  -53  -51  -61  -82  -83  -1 
Portfolio investment: Receipts  153  160  201  155  114  -41 
Portfolio investment: Payments  206  211  262  237  197  -40 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. 
Direct Investment Income. 
Net direct investment income—receipts from U.S. 
direct investment abroad less payments on foreign 
direct investment in the United States—declined 
$25 billion in 2002, to $78 billion (table 7). A small 
increase in direct investment receipts was outweighed 
by a much larger rise in payments last year. 
The $2 billion pickup in receipts on U.S. direct 
investment abroad last year was relatively meager, 
considering that the U.S. gross direct investment posi-
tion abroad rose roughly $100 billion (chart 7) and 
that total foreign growth rebounded after stagnating 
in 2001. However, profits are likely to be related 
more to the level of capacity utilization than to the 
growth of real GDP as such. Foreign growth picked 
up last year but probably not enough to substantially 
increase resource utilization and profits. Moreover, 
more than half of U.S. direct investment is in Europe, 
where growth remained low relative to that in the 
United States or other U.S. trading partners. All of 
these factors likely held back the growth of receipts 
on U.S. direct investment abroad last year. 
Chart 7. U.S. direct investment abroad: 
Position and receipts, 1980-2002 
[graph plotting two data: a line for receipts in billions of  dollars and bars for position in billions of dollars. Position  starts at about $350 billion in 1980 and stays between there  and about $400 billion until 1985 when it begins to move  steadily up, hitting about $750 billion in 1994 and ending  at about $1700 billion in 2002.  Receipts starts at about $35 billion in 1980 and stays  between there and about $30 billion until 1986 when it  starts climbing, It reaches a high of about $150 billion in  2000, and ends 2002 at about $130 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The position is the average of the year-end 
current-cost measures for the current and previous years. The year-end 
position for 2002 was constructed by adding the recorded direct investment 
capital flows and current-cost adjustment during 2002 to the recorded 
year-end position for 2001. 
SOURCE. BEA; Federal Reserve Board. In contrast to receipts, payments rose a substantial 
$27 billion last year, bouncing back after a $38 bil-
lion decline in 2001. A small increase in foreign 
direct investment holdings in the United States 
(chart 8) explains some of the increase in payments. 
More importantly, increases in the profitability of 
foreign investments in the U.S. last year followed 
abnormally low levels in 2001 and helped to boost 
payments. The recovery in these profits was wide-
spread, but the industries that fell most sharply in 
2001—manufacturing and wholesale trade—showed 
the largest growth in 2002. 
Chart 8. Foreign direct investment in the United States: 
Position and payments, 1980-2002 
[graph plotting two data: a line for payments in billions of  dollars and bars for position in billions of dollars.  Position starts at about $125 billion in 1980 then moves  steadily up, reaching about $600 billion in 1994 and  $1000 billion in 1999. It ends 2002 at about $1500 billion.  Payments start 1980 at about $10 billion. In 1982 it is down  to about $2 billion. Up to about $13 billion in 1988. In 1991  it is down to about -$2 billion. Then up steadily, reaching a  maximum of about $60 billion in 2000, down to about  $25 billion in 2001 and ending at about $50 billion in 2002.] 
NOTE. See notes to chart 7. 
Portfolio Investment Income. 
Portfolio receipts represent the dividend and interest 
income that U.S. residents receive on their holdings 
of foreign financial assets, whereas portfolio pay-
ments represent the dividends and interest that for-
eigners receive on their holdings of U.S. financial 
assets. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
estimates these payments and receipts by applying 
estimates of the interest or dividend-payout rates for 
various assets to estimates of the holdings of those 
assets. Portfolio investment income does not include 
capital gains or losses associated with changes in 
asset prices. 
Movements in net portfolio income—receipts 
minus payments—have tracked movements in the 
U.S. net portfolio investment position fairly closely 
(chart 9) because rates of return on portfolio invest-
ments in the United States and abroad are quite 
similar (chart 10). Net portfolio income turned nega-
tive in 1985, the same year that the net portfolio 
investment position moved from that of net creditor 
to net debtor, and it followed the general contour of 
the net investment position in subsequent years. More 
recently, however, declines in interest rates have 
tended to reduce both payments and receipts, thereby 
leading the deficit in portfolio income to widen more 
slowly than it would have otherwise. This effect was 
particularly pronounced last year, when the negative 
net income balance widened only $1 billion, to 
$83 billion. 
Chart 9. Net portfolio investment: 
Position and income, 1980-2002 
[graph plotting two data: a line for net income in billions of  dollars and bars for net position in billions of dollars.  In 1980 net position was about -$50 billion and net income  about $2 billion. They go up, net position reaching about  $100 billion in 1983 and net income about $10 billion.  Then they go down, net position reaching about -$325 billion  and net income about -$32 billion. In 1994 net position is  about -$400 billion, net income about -$30 billion. In 1998  net position was about -$1050 billion and net income about  -$50 billion. They end 2002 with net position about  -$2100 billion and net income about -$80 billion.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. The net position is the Federal Reserve Board's 
estimate of the average position during the year. Through 2001 these 
estimates are based on quarterly financial flows and year-end position 
estimates published by the BEA. For 2002, the average is based on year-end 
2001 position data and quarterly financial flows during 2002. The net 
position excludes U.S. gold holdings and foreign holdings of U.S. currency. 
SOURCE. BEA; Federal Reserve Board. 
Chart 10. Rate of return on U.S. portfolio investments, 
1980-2002 
[graph plotting two lines: foreign holdings in the United  States and U.S. holdings abroad.  In 1980, foreign holdings were about 8.75%, U.S. abroad  about 10.25%. In 1981 they hit maximums, foreign about  11%, abroad about 12.75%. In 1983 foreign is down to  about 8%, abroad about 9.5%. In 1987 foreign was about  6.75%, abroad about 6.25%. In 1989 foreign was about 8%  abroad about 7.75%. In 1993 4.25%, abroad about 3.75%.  They ended 2002 with foreign holdings about 3% and U.S.  holdings abroad about 2.75%.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. 
Unilateral Transfers. 
Unilateral transfers include government grant and 
pension payments as well as private transfers to and from foreigners. In 2002, the deficit on net unilateral 
transfers widened to $56 billion. 
FINANCIAL AND CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
TRANSACTIONS. 
The counterpart of the increased U.S. current account 
deficit last year was a rise in net financial inflows of 
foreign savings. In recent years, net private capital 
inflows have accounted for most of the overall net 
inflows required to finance the current account defi-
cit, and 2002 was no exception. However, even as the 
current account deficit rose to a record $503 billion 
last year, net private capital inflows remained about 
unchanged at $381 billion, while net official inflows 
jumped to $93 billion (table 8). 
table 8. Composition of U.S. capital flows, 1997-2002 
Billions of dollars 





Current account balance  -128  -204  -293  -410  -393  -503  -240  -263 
Capital account balance  0  1  -3  1  1  1  0  0 
Financial account balance  219  64  265  409  382  474  160  314 
Official capital, net  18  -27  55  36  0  93  54  40 
Official capital,Foreign official assets in the United States  19  -20  44  38  5  97  55  42 
Official capital,U.S. official reserve assets  -1  -7  9  0  -5  -4  -1  -2 
Official capital,Other U. S. government assets  0  0  3  -1  0  0  0  0 
Private capital, net  201  91  210  373  382  381  107  274 
Private capital, Net inflows reported by U. S. banking offices  8  4  -22  -32  -18  92  -47  138 
Private capital, Securities transactions, net  173  49  126  251  305  340  155  185 
Private capital, Private foreign net purchases (+) of U.S. securities  292  185  254  378  400  338  163  175 
Private capital, Treasury securities  130  29  -44  -77  -8  53  -12  66 
Private capital, Agency bonds  26  5  43  96  86  68  35  33 
Private capital, Corporate and other bonds  67  106  143  166  202  161  104  57 
Private capital, Corporate stocks  69  46  113  192  119  56  36  19 
Private capital, U.S. net purchases (-) of foreign securities  -119  -136  -128  -128  -95  2  -8  10 
Private capital, Bonds  -61  -35  -14  -24  12  21  11  10 
Private capital, Stocks  -58  -101  -114  -104  -107  -19  -18  0 
Private capital, Stock swaps  -3  -96  -123  -80  -45  -3  -2  -1 
Private capital, Direct investment, net  1  36  101  129  3  -93  -50  -43 
Private capital, Foreign direct investment in the United States  106  179  289  308  131  30  14  16 
Private capital, U. S. direct investment abroad  -105  -143  -189  -178  -128  -124  -64  -59 
Private capital, Foreign holdings of U.S. currency  25  17  22  1  24  22  12  10 
Private capital, Other  -5  -15  -17  23  68  21  37  -16 
Statistical discrepancy  -91  139  31  0  11  29  79  -51 
SOURCE. BEA, U.S. international transactions accounts. 
A prominent theme in last year's capital flows was 
the reduced demand by private foreign entities for 
U.S. corporate assets. Private foreign net purchases of 
all U.S. securities declined $62 billion in 2002. Net 
purchases of U.S. corporate and other bonds and of 
corporate stocks fell $41 billion and $63 billion 
respectively. These declines were only partially offset 
by a positive $43 billion swing of flows into U.S. 
Treasury and agency securities; these flows appear to 
have been driven by a flight to safety among inves-
tors. Private foreign direct investment in the United 
States also fell off substantially, from $131 billion in 
2001 to $30 billion in 2002. 
The decline in the demand for claims on the U.S. 
private sector last year may have been associated 
with increased concerns about future profitability and 
returns; these concerns were perhaps prompted by 
the uneven recovery of the U.S. economy and the 
continued poor performance of equity markets. Simi-
lar concerns may have prompted an analogous pull-
back of U.S. investments abroad. Private U.S. net 
purchases of foreign securities plummeted from 
$95 billion in 2001 to about zero last year. This drop 
reflected net sales of foreign bonds by U.S. private 
investors for the second consecutive year as well as 
sharply reduced purchases of foreign stocks. U.S. 
direct investment abroad held up, but that was due 
to U.S. corporations not repatriating earnings and 
extending more credit to their foreign affiliates; new 
equity capital channeled toward direct investment 
abroad fell from $50 billion in 2001 to $27 billion 
last year. 
With private foreign purchases of U.S. assets fall-
ing about as much as private U.S. purchases of foreign assets, private net capital flows were about 
unchanged last year, even as the current account 
deficit rose $110 billion. Most of this shortfall in 
private financing was made up by a substantial rise in 
official net capital inflows to $93 billion, with nearly 
all of the remaining shortfall showing up in the 
statistical discrepancy. The higher pace of these 
acquisitions last year may have reflected the desire of 
some foreign authorities to restrain the rise in their 
currencies' value against the dollar by intervening in 
foreign exchange markets. This explanation is sug-
gested by the concentration of foreign official inflows 
in the second and fourth quarters of last year, when 
the foreign exchange value of the dollar registered its 
largest declines. 
Capital account transactions, which consist mainly 
of debt forgiveness and wealth transfers associated 
with immigration, netted to $1 billion last year, the 
same amount as in the previous two years. 
PROSPECTS FOR 2003. 
Forecasters generally expect that rates of economic 
growth will pick up both in the United States and in 
its major trading partners later this year and in 2004. 
Assuming this acceleration of activity takes place as 
expected, the U.S. external deficit likely will widen as 
U.S. imports of goods and services rise by a greater 
amount than U.S. exports of goods and services. The 
decline in the dollar that has been observed from 
early 2002 to date is unlikely to restrain the widening 
of the deficit by much, as it has been relatively 
small—about 5 percent for the broad real dollar 
index—and its effects will be spread over a number 
of years. In fact, the initial effect of a depreciation of 
the dollar is generally to raise the U.S. current account 
deficit temporarily, since it raises import prices, 
and hence the value of imports, more rapidly than it 
stimulates sales of exports. 